

The other Face of Janus: Or the Mindset of Conservatism

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Abstract

This article aims to analysis the attitudes and tendencies of conservatism, which has become current again with the rapid political and social changes that have occurred in the world in recent years, from both a historical and methodological perspective. The foundational concepts of this analysis are ideology, mentality, and tradition. The reason for selecting this mindset of concepts assumes that conservatism is a composite form of various tendencies. In this text, the relationship between conservative thought and other political ideologies and thoughts will be examined, along with the intellectual and conceptual coordinates of conservative thought. These determinations and definitions will be made considering the following questions.

Firstly, the arguments put forth by classical conservatism against the Cartesian world design of Enlightenment philosophy will be discussed. Secondly, the new forms that conservative ideology has adopted and the ways in which its interrelations with other ideologies will be explored. A common question related to conservative thought is whether it originates from institutionalized action or if it is merely a cynical thought limited to reacting to and commenting on the ideas of other ideologies and ideologues as a reactionary contingency. Does conservatism have its own unique fundamental theory and thought? These questions will be analyzed this discussion. Finally, this text will inquire whether conservative thought has universal validity everywhere or if it is limited to a reaction against the cultural, national, and historical context in which it exists. Answers to these questions will be sought in this text.

Key Words: Conservaticism, Mentality Ideologie, Tradition, Past, Evulation Intituition

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1. Introduction

The title of this article refers to the rear-facing aspect of Janus which two-faced sculpture of Ancient Rome. Can this two-faced sculpture symbolize tensions between conservatism and other ideologies with its faces looking towards the past and the future? The aim of this article is to analyze the content of conservatism as a social phenomenon and tendency, as well as to explore the core motivations that make this tendency conservative. It aims to examine the political, ideological relationships, and connections of conservatism, examining when and in what context it takes positions for or against certain issues.

We intend to define conservatism as a composite form that interacts with other political ideologies and thoughts both methodologically and historically. While analyzing the conservative tendency, we also aim to consider its association with various trends. We will do this within both methodological and historical frameworks. In analyzing the conservative tendency, we will take into account the familiar connotations of conservative attitudes and, at the same time, strive to determine its new practices in the social sphere, as well as its mental coordinates within historical and methodological boundaries. By methodological boundaries, we mean not only considering conservatism as a philosophical and ideological concept but also historically defining the stance of conservatism within the social conditions and habitat it exists in.

In this text, the concept of "stance" will be approached as a broad attitude and state of mind in a wider sense, encompassing not only the establishment's stance against the status quo but also individual-to-individual, individual-to-society, and individual-to-universe relationships. While analyzing conservative thought, we will seek to scrutinize both the counterarguments to conservatism and the criticisms and questions it has developed against the ideologies shaped by Enlightenment philosophy, which conservatism opposes.

Is there a universally applicable attitude, behavior, idea, or tendency that corresponds to the concept of conservatism everywhere it is found? What are the basic characteristics that distinguish a conservative attitude from other social behavioral forms? Within the historical and social conditions that produce these attitudes, what are the structural institutional relationships that made make a man conservative? Since every intellectual acquisition is the mental product of the era and social conditions in which it exists, how do the social and political conditions in which conservatism thought exists generate attitudes and tendencies? Since conservatism is often defined as a conglomerate of various inclinations, how do these attitudes and tendencies position themselves in the face of the transformative and revolutionary forces of modern life? What is the nature of conservatism as a composite of which inclinations? What concrete experiences and historical conditions give rise to these inclinations? As a mindset, what kind of tension does conservatism create with the passage of time, given human nature's inclination towards either novelty or tradition? Is conservatism in pursuit of outdated institutions, or does it possess a revivalist or irredentist quality, seeking to revive

the dead structures of the past? Does this perspective, like the statue of Janus, express the tension between two different times, the past and the future, caught between their gravitational forces? Is conservatism a thought form that mentally appropriates today with yesterday's concepts and institutions? Do minds within the conservative inclination possess a pessimistic disposition because they feel like exiles in the modern world?

With the questions posed above, we will attempt to determine and define the mental coordinates of conservative thought. To do this, we will first examine how the concept of conservatism is used in European languages and the content associated with it. Afterward, we will endeavor to delineate the methodological, philosophical, and political boundaries of this concept. To understand the historical evolution and transformation of a term, language serves as the most crucial guide. When we examine the changing meanings and contents of the conservative thought as a societal attitude, we can express conservatism as a tendency that was born within modern life and, therefore, as a modern ideology that shapes attitudes and behaviors within the societal and political institutions of modern life. Understanding the different forms of conservative thought in various time periods and social contexts can be achieved through conceptual tools within discourse. However, since this article does not focus on discourse-level analysis, we will limit ourselves to analyzing how the concept of conservatism has been used in Europe's societal and political history.

No thought can be conceived independently of the social context it emerges in and the language that serves as the tool for understanding and comprehension within that society. Since concepts cannot be invented solely by an individual's capabilities, they necessitate the existence of larger institutions and structures. Language not only originates from thought but also exists within the possibilities of thought (Naisbit, 1990; 95) Therefore, concepts and thoughts cannot be conceived independently of the formative, educational, and creative influence of language on society and individuals. Examining in which language, for what purpose, and in what context conservative thought has been conceptualized is essential for understanding the coordinates of this thought as a societal attitude, Robert Scruton remind that, a right becomes political reality only with the power that is able to enforce it. Rights without powers are political fictions. Natural rights could only be enforced by the power of civil jurisdiction, which in turn exists to uphold the 'positive rights' of a given system of law (Scruton, 1984; 34).

When we examine the historical use of the concept of conservatism in Europe, we find that the term was first applied, albeit not by this name, to the Cavaliers group during the 17th-century English Revolution, which was one of the conflicting groups alongside the Roundheads. Later, to represent conservatism, this group would be referred to as "Tory." The term "Tory" was initially used to describe the group that supported James, the Catholic brother of Charles II, in his bid for the throne against the parliamentary group known as Whigs, who were the liberals of that era. The word "Tory" is derived from the Irish Gaelic word "Tóraidhe," which also meant a dispossessed Irish outlaw. The term "Tory" was also used during the American Revolutionary War to refer to colonists loyal to the British monarchy, and it is still used in Canada to describe center-right conservatives. In 1830, the

Quarterly Review stated, "A more suitable term for what is called Tory might be conservative party," and later, Canning and Peel adopted this term. In 1840, Thomas Carlyle used the term "conservative" to describe what he saw as opposition. In continental Europe, especially in Germany, these groups were often referred to as Christian Democrats (Hamilton, 2020;65). Although the concept of conservatism gained a political content in Germany relatively late, it had been used previously by Edmund Burke and French conservatives to express their thoughts on the French Revolution. The use of this concept may correspond to a new historical development, but it does not fully explain the nature of this phenomenon. However, the concept of conservatism gained political and ideological content primarily when Enlightenment thought began to use the term "progressiveness." Therefore, methodologically, it would be useful to analyze the specific form of conservative thought in a specific time period within specific content and methodological and epistemological contexts rather than evaluating all forms of tradition within conservatism.

In France, around the 1840s, the innovations brought about by modernization were characterized by conservatives as *decadence*. These reactions contributed to the widespread use of this term. Particularly during these years, symbolists argued that under the corrosive influence of a decaying civilization, the pillars of religion, morality, justice, and society were disintegrating. The refinement of desires, sensations, and tastes, while indicative of social evolution, also led to various reactions. This refinement reflected not only signs of societal progress but also evoked different responses. It expressed a longing for the old aristocratic roots, coupled with a horror of the dominant influence of the masses and intellectual limitations in an increasingly democratic society (Weber, E, 1986; 24).

In determining the coordinates of this thought, Constan Frantz highlights a kind of prototype of the concept of conservatism, referring to it as pre-rational. This pre-rational consciousness explains how the forms of pre-Enlightenment ideologies intertwined with modern forms before Enlightenment philosophy bracketed human reason. Thus, Constant attempts to explain how the pre-Enlightenment influences behind political theory intersect with modern modes of thinking. In Germany, the concept of conservatism did not have a widely accepted meaning until around 1830. Even during the period when the term was used to indicate that a new historical formation was emerging, it had not yet gained a distinct clarity in distinguishing all the limits of the concept.

When conducting a methodological analysis of Conservative thought as a societal attitude, we believe it would be instructive to review several attempts aimed at determining the nature of this thought. Examining the contemporary manifestations of conservatism as a modern ideology within social life and the process through which social actions and acquisitions transform into an organization or political party will enrich the analytical possibilities for understanding the political and ideological stances of this thought. Among theorists interested in political parties, three typical figures representing German cultural continuity are Julius Stahl, Constantin Frantz, and Gustav Radbruch. Radbruch, in

his attempt to explain conservative thought, seeks to describe the tendencies of modern political parties, exploring how the values of philosophical systems intertwine with the forms of earlier values, close-period values, and current values (Manheim,1986;17).

Even if one phenomenon transforms into another, due to the formal nature of tradition characterized by at least a traceable, semi-reactionary nature, he expresses that conservative action, akin to tradition, does not possess a specific history or, at least, a clearly identifiable history. Radbruch, on the other hand, asserts that "Conservatism" represents a historical and sociological continuity, developing directly in connection with a particular sociological and historical context.

2. Methodological Definitions

When determining the distinguishing characteristics of conservative thought, it is not methodologically correct to generalize the stance towards the statusquo and normative regulations of classical conservatism to every society. This is because providing a universally applicable definition of conservatism in every society is not an easy task. Instead of attempting to define conservatism as a universally valid concept in every society, it is a healthier approach to identify the attitudes and tendencies that correspond to the positions or emotional states of certain classes during certain historical conditions at the level of societal mindset. In seeking to understand the qualities of these attitudes and behaviors, at least alleviating some uncertainty can be achieved by determining the primary driving forces that guide the practices of conservative ideology.

Within this methodological framework, we will attempt to analyze the tendencies (disposition, stance, posture) and forms of conservative thought and ideology. To address the ambiguity surrounding definitions of conservatism, it will be enlightening to delve into the philosophical and theoretical roots of this thought and its opposition. The theoretical and philosophical roots of these two different epistemologies draw from two different philosophical traditions: Natural Law Theory and Historicism. These two different approaches not only represent philosophical theories but also two different epistemologies and, consequently, two different worldviews (Sunar,1986;10). In the 18th century, the foundation of these distinctions was primarily based on the assumption that legal theory was based on the natural law notion, while positive law was more grounded in a symbolic concept of society. Karl Mannheim labels this as Historicism in his theory of knowledge sociology. According to Mannheim, Historicism represents the empirical mental nature of conservatism, shaping the worldview and imagination of practical political relations within a specific sociological and historical context. This understanding encompasses the relationships between human-object, human-cosmos, human-human, human-society, and human-state, summarizing these relationships as a kind of homo conservatis.

Whether these questions arise from a liberal positivist worldview or from the perspective of Marxist economic politics, they represent a tendency and acquisition towards a conservative attitude. These questions are, in an ex post facto sense, the

result of a linear logical cause-and-effect reasoning. They are based on the assumption that a rational and mechanistic worldview and history progress on a linear legality. Max Weber, despite not being generally regarded from a conservative perspective, developed one of the first systematic theoretical criticisms against this secular, progressive, and universal worldview. Weber's critique would later become fundamental arguments in defense of conservative ideology. While interpreting the secular worldview of natural law and positivist epistemology, Weber does not entirely oppose these arguments. Instead, he methodologically acknowledges that history is not always linear but sometimes follows a cyclical logic, advocating for an understanding-based sociology rather than causal explanation.

Weber defines tradition as entrenched habits that have always existed but only transform into an ideology and reflex under certain conditions (Weber,1986,25). However, he emphasizes that this transformation into an ideology and reflex only occurs under specific circumstances. Moreover, he argues that rather than explaining social reality based on legality, understanding can vary depending on historical and social conditions within which the subject finds itself. This variation is not only related to comprehension but also to the tools of comprehension themselves, which can change.

Michael Oakeshott asserts that conservative thought questions not science but scientism ideology. He distinguishes between scientific research and scientism, as well as between rational inquiries and research and rationalism (Oakeshott.2006,3). The former is considered an ideology, while the latter represents science. In his challenge to the Enlightenment's progressive reason, Michael Oakeshott claims that progress is contextual rather than being a cause-and-effect relationship. While challenging this ideology of progress, Oakeshott also contradicts the belief of thinkers in political thought history such as Hegelians, liberal socialists, and Marxists that history necessarily moves in a certain direction. Oakeshott illustrates this point by providing a concrete example from ancient Greece, where governance forms were cyclical rather than progressive (Oakeshott, 2006; 16)

In opposition to positivist normative ideology, one of the fundamental arguments put forth by conservative thought is the objection to the linear logic of positivist normative ideology that shapes all political, social, and economic theories in a harmonious and lawful manner. Just as Marxists criticize the "individual" of classical economics as an everlasting, timeless natural category, conservatism parallels this critique by arguing that the "individual" is merely a moment in the historical context and a transitional category within feudal society's undeveloped forms that found its place in social evolution at a specific stage. Economic-political theory generally interprets the phenomenon of conservatism as a temporary moment and intermediary categories, ideological remnants of feudal society, at a specific stage of social evolution rather than as part of social progress (Kekes,1997;43).

In addition to criticisms of all these progressive positivist ideologies, a common argument in conservative critiques is that conservatism lacks a philosophical theory. Conservative thought is often accused of being more dogmatic and reactionary in nature. It is described as an apologetic attitude that developed in response to the rationality of Enlightenment ideology and its political regulations. Responses to these arguments developed by conservative thought can be summarized as follows: Classical conservatism, due to its nature, primarily derives from social and political practices and, therefore, opposes the abstract normative theoretical thought of the Enlightenment. Conservative thought is critical of the liberal and socialist ideologies it opposes, which primarily rely on abstract normative thought and worldviews. In this sense, conservatism, in its narrow sense of self-conscience, possesses a skeptical view towards unexperienced normative regulations through a priori reasoning. Therefore, as John Kekes puts it, conservative thought constantly harbors doubts about a priori preconceptions and the legitimacy and truth of its political and social designs. It argues that political and social designs reject the abstract rationalism and value assumptions (Kekes, 1997; 351).

What Kekes emphasizes here is that the utopian vision of the French Jacobins, which aimed to construct society through revolution based on the abstract natural rights theory, relies on rational abstraction and a priori assumptions. In contrast, conservatives, including the classical conservative Edmund Burke and those who followed him, argue that institutions exist based not on theoretical principles but on culture and tradition, what they call "latent wisdom," which is a hidden common sense and wisdom (Burke, 1951,150). They assume that the mechanistic Cartesian worldview of positivist ideology, with its universal abstract principles, cannot create a good society and political structure. Instead, conservative thought views society as a complex organism rather than a machine. Therefore, it acknowledges that designing a good society solely based on the abstract principles of reason, without the accumulated experience of the past, is a utopian approach (Kekes, J, 1997.365).

One of the fundamental characteristics of conservative thought is its skepticism, which assumes a moderate stance between universal regularities and principles and specific, particular domains. Conservatives, unlike liberals and socialists, are skeptical and cautious in the face of universal recommendations and prescriptions. They argue that abstract propositions cannot be applied to concrete conditions. Therefore, they remain skeptical and cautious regarding universal recommendations and prescriptions, unlike liberals and socialists. Burke, who is considered a precursor of classical conservatism, questions how an object, isolated from the concrete relationships of society, can be either praised or criticized within the context of metaphysical abstraction (Burke,1951,73).

According to Burke, the human imagination possesses two significant faculties: sublimity and beauty. Sublimity is the response of human nature to dominant and overwhelming natural events. This response stems from the instinct to preserve one's existence and is rooted in fear. Beauty, on the other hand, is the love inherent in human nature, related to ordinary objects that evoke a sense of love. Love is a form of response to the social relationships of an individual, manifesting

as a reaction to the surroundings. The fear directed towards formidable powers generates obedience to authority. This fear, directed towards sovereign entities, is more determinative in shaping human behavior than the everyday reactions to the environment. Burke argues that the fundamental experience of human interaction with objects is motivated by the desire to preserve the status quo. This is because, in the Weberian sense, power that holds the monopoly on violence and the capacity for inflicting pain is dominant. This power not only influences thoughts but also deeply affects emotions and the human imagination. Without the presence of fear and the sense of mortality, it is impossible to keep individuals away from terror. The sovereignty of rulers and commanders shares a relationship and quality with fear, making terror a fundamental emotional experience of authority.

According to Burke, this fear contributes to the psychological structure, being an integral part of social life (Steinberg, 2015; 31). No passion renders the faculties of movement and thinking as powerless as fear does. Due to the concern about pain or death, fear operates in a manner reminiscent of actual suffering. Therefore, anything appearing frightening, regardless of its size, is sublime; it is impossible to view anything potentially dangerous as insignificant. Many animals, akin to almost all poisonous creatures, are considered objects of dread, even if their sizes are not significant, thus elevating ideas about the sublime. Adding a notion of fear to large objects makes them incomparably more substantial. A flat area on a vast expanse of land is not an idea easily dismissed; the view of such a plain can be as expansive as that of an ocean, but can the view of such a plain be as expansive as that of the ocean? (Burke, 2009: 125)

Huntington, on the other hand, defines conservatism as an ideology without consistent values. (Huntington, 1957; 459). O'Hara has also provided a similarly comprehensive definition. O'Hara argues that conservatism is inherently an 'adjective.' In other words, he claims that conservatism itself is an interpretation focused on shared values rather than a set of values. At the core of O'Hara's argument is an epistemological definition of conservatism. Compared to Robin and others, he asserts that the conservative is primarily an advocate of a skeptical epistemology (O'Hara, 2011:24). This epistemology is grounded on two principles, namely the "principle of knowledge" and the "principle of change." These principles define society and its intermediary institutions and members as highly complex and dynamic due to their continuously evolving nature. Consequently, data and theories about society have a rather uncertain structure. (O'Hara, 2011: 49–50). In the "principle of change," the effects of societal innovations cannot be precisely known in advance by evaluating the current state of society.

Therefore, social change (a) always carries the risk of undermining beneficial institutions and norms. (b) It cannot guarantee the achievement of its objectives. Hence, societies should avoid the risk of social change. Therefore, the burden of proof for this criticism directed at conservatives belongs to the side advocating the "new," not to those with a conservative attitude. Additionally, change, when it occurs, ideally should be (a) gradual, (b) reversible if possible, and (c) meticulously evaluated before moving on to the next stage (O'Hara, 2011: 88).

O'Hara's two principles can be used to form an ideological orientation that can be characterized as conservative. Moreover, they are compatible with the views of many well-known conservatives attempting to define conservatism. For example, when considering the explanations of Michael Oakeshott and Roger Scruton (Scruton, 2006: vii) about conservatism, both thinkers (Oakeshott, 1991: 423).their conservatism on epistemological claims about the dangers of rationalism, rejecting the idea that conservatism consists of fixed beliefs and values. Oakeshott consciously purges conservatism from specific ideological content. While he acknowledges that certain ideas and assumptions may be associated with English conservatism, he separates them from conservative thought. According to Oakeshott, the conservative attitude does not necessarily have any specific belief linked to understanding the universe or human behavior about the world. Instead, conservatism defines itself as an orientation specific to a style of governance that begins with "understanding how we are" (Oakeshott, 1991: 424). Summarizing Oakeshott's conservatism (Oakeshott, 1991: 408), he defines conservatism as a combination of tendencies rather than concrete beliefs (Blackburn, 202; 433). Conservatism, as expressed by O'Hara, is "situational." It defines itself not through what it is but through what it is not, being more historical than philosophical (Blackburn, 2022, 451).

Answering these questions about conservatism also determines the analytical framework and the concept sets to be used in analyzing the theoretical and intellectual foundations of conservative ideology. To analyze the theoretical and intellectual foundations of conservative ideology, it becomes necessary to combine and mobilize the concepts of cultural sociology, knowledge sociology, and religious sociology within the wide workshop of history. In addition to using the concepts of the disciplines mentioned above to analyze conservatism as an attitude within the historical, social, and political dimensions, Max Weber's concept of "Die Geisteshaltung" (mindset) will be employed to establish the structure-idea relationship, which is the institutionalized form of social actions Weber used this concept primarily to describe an attitude that nourished traditional thought. Tradition represents continuity that connects the individual and the social in the eyes of conservatives (Kekes; 1997: 365). Although the concept of tradition has a longer history than conservatism, it became significant in the late 18th century as a political mobilization tool for reimagining the past, as Eric Hobsbawm puts it (Hobsbawm,1983, 265).

Conservative thought perceives the relationship between subject and object as an organic whole between structure and idea. The relationship between structure and idea here refers to the structured form of human behaviors and attitudes, expressing a certain regularity and direction. These structured and established attitudes and behaviors, within a specific social and historical climate, gradually transform the initial norms into forms over time. These forms also shape the perceptual frameworks that encompass the relationships of human-human, human-nature, and human-object, constituting the mental practices of social actors. The domain of these relationships also forms the habitus of individuals within social conditions at both the community or organization level. This habitus at the

community or organization level expresses the entirety of both social action and mental practices.

Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus is defined as the collective behavioral codes of individuals within a social group or organization, considered as mental practices. Whether conservatism is examined as a political ideology, a psychological attitude, a mental reaction (Bourdieu,1999;24) Bergsonian terms, "intuition,"(Kıvılcımlı, 2008,4).it should be noted that conservatism is not a universal characteristic applicable to all societies. These attitudes and behaviors will take a position under the influence of specific internal and external dynamics within certain social conditions.

One argument against the claim that conservatism does not have a comprehensive philosophical theory is that, even though conservative thought may not have a unified philosophical theory, within its two-century history, tradition has been considered as accumulated wisdom in the philosophy of history. Therefore, besides the long history of tradition, the short history of conservative thought cannot be evaluated independently of its political organization, attitude, and ideology. If conservatism is an attitude and a way of behaving, when and under what historical and social political conditions does it manifest itself? One of the fundamental arguments of the positivist progressive understanding posed against conservatism is that conservative thought cannot self-define as self-conscience, but rather, it is a reactionary attitude explained more by the influence and interactions of others.

Against these criticisms directed at conservative thought, even though it may not be directly related to conservative ideology, indirect counterarguments question the linear logic of modern rational (rational) worldviews that reject and negate the particularities such as objectivity and universality in Enlightenment and describe its ideology as the cosmic destiny of the new world. These counterarguments were formulated by Simmel in the sociology of forms. Simmel's fundamental question posed against positivist universal theories was: If the universal progressive assumptions of the natural social design are correct, how can the acquisition inherent to the object, which is not given but is cultural and ideological, be explained independently of culture and ideology? If meaning is not an inherent quality of the object, then, consequently, how can the accumulation of knowledge originating from practice be explained within which theoretical assumptions designed to examine the qualities, legality, or permanent characteristics of objects are combined with practice (Freund,1990,165).

According to Simmel, the qualities of objects are determined more by the form of social relationships than the content itself. In this determination, the forms of specific social relationships have as much influence as sociality (Simmel, 2020;307). The forms of these particular social relationships are constructed by the individual, nature, and history as a known thing; but as a knowing subject, they also shape nature and history. If conservative attitude cannot explain itself based on its own sphere and dynamics, Karl Mannheim will answer the question of how conservative ideology positions itself epistemologically based on external factual, political, and ideological realities. Mannheim argues that conservatism already has

an empirical foundation rather than an abstract social design. According to conservative thought, if practice itself is accepted as the basis of reason, then conservative ideology cannot have such a theoretical problem. Karl Mannheim characterizes this empirical and practical accumulation as a symbolic category (Mannheim, 1986; 65).

3. The Relationships of Conservatism with Other Ideologies

When analyzing the relationship between Liberalism and Conservatism, it is essential to emphasize, above all, that these two ideologies are fundamentally worldviews before principles. Liberalism and Conservatism constitute not only sets of ideas but also two distinct structural thought patterns. These thought patterns always derive their definitions from each other. The reason for this lies in the necessity to delve into the profound levels of these structures rather than confining oneself to conflicts and tensions to comprehend. The condition arising from the depth of these structures is not merely conflict, irreconcilability, disagreement, but rather, it is differentiation (Bruce, 2005; 217).

The relationship between conservative thought and liberalism is a pair of perspectives that mutually influence each other as thoughts and methods impacting human and societal activities. In the developmental process of shaping the political order and institutions in Western countries, these thoughts have interacted with each other. Conservatism and liberalism are understood by analyzing the assumptions and arguments that particularly contain possible similarities with liberal attitudes, alongside the aspects forming the most dramatic contrasts with liberal views (Buchanan, J. 2005: 45). For instance, the authoritarian tendency attributed to conservatism, as a characteristic, is a phenomenon observed across cultures throughout history in different periods, displaying intolerance towards differences in time, space, and context. Conversely, this holds true for racial, political, and moral tolerance as well (Steinner, 2009: 142). Conservative ideology, at times, intertwines with elements of liberalism, occasionally with romantic forms of cultural nativism, and intermittently with nationalist tendencies, sometimes manifesting itself in religious forms. In the 1980s, to overcome the crisis of the welfare state, conservative thought, which existed in many countries, was dressed in economic rationality, thus instrumentalizing neoliberal arguments to legitimize itself. In response, some segments of society, marginalized by positivist and secular reasoning, sought refuge in conservatism, leading to alignment with certain totalitarian or authoritarian ideologies (Bourdieu, 1999, 24).

Part of those opposing the normative political ideology of positivist progressivism, which stood against the destruction of societal achievements, formed the basis of center-right political parties. In Europe (Bourdieu, 1999; 27). Christian Democratic parties representing conservative thought gradually shifted toward a more central stance over a century, reacting against industrialization and urbanization. In contrast, in societies that had not completed industrialization and urbanization, conservative political ideology remained a fundamental political behavior of rural communities, consistently opposing the efforts of bureaucratic elites advocating modernization.

The societal legitimacy of conservative thought finds greater approval among rural and village communities, where it establishes its base as a reaction to urbanization and modernization, serving as a vehicle for the mobilization of the masses in response to the innovations of modern life. From the latter half of the 19th century onwards, rural reactions to these changes ranged from advocating constitutional monarchy to opposing all institutions of bourgeois democratic revolutions, even veering towards fascism.

Besides approaches that characterize conservative thought as the cognitive framework for perceiving the world and objects in a traditional society, there are also approaches that define this thought and tendency based on intuition and mentality (Nelson, 1990, 289). One of the fundamental approaches that define conservatism on a mental basis is attributed to Max Weber. According to Weber, one of the analytical tools for understanding the attitudes and behaviors that create a mental tradition and ideal type of a cognitive acquisition in a societal sense is the concept of mentality. Although initially considered a psychological concept, later on, it was also used as an explanatory concept in political sociology to understand the attitudes and behaviors towards modern political institutions and actions in a behavioral method. In a Durkheimian sense, collective representation, within Max Weber's ideal types, is defined as the structured institutionalized forms of habits that are determined by both society and that determine society within social acquisition and actions.

Conservative thought, much like the Janus statue in Rome, has a dual-faced nature, looking both backward and forward. In terms of its orientation, it is as much about embracing history as it is about apprehension and anxiety regarding the future. The inclination of this mental attitude between the past and the future is predominantly oriented towards the past. In this relationship between the past, present, and future, there is an inherent continuity that perceives the speed and timing of social change in a more evolutionary and gradual manner. Conservative thought is often seen as a form of elderly ideology compared to youth, as it emphasizes an individual's life with a known beginning and end, placing greater significance on what they have left behind than what lies ahead.

The core characteristics of classical conservatism thought include nativism, localism, rootedness, basic authority, and symbiotic relationships in traditional structures, represented as family and solidarity relationships (Burke E, 1951,254). These characteristics emphasize the institutionalization of acquisitions and mentalities in societal and political structures. Nativism and rootedness in conservative thought provide a foundation that later serves as the basis for the theories of nationalist ideologies.

Karl Mannheim's proposition in the sociology of knowledge, regarding the Enlightenment thought and its intellectual institutions, grounds its arguments against positivist ideologies rooted in natural law theory on three fundamental beliefs. These beliefs can take various forms, ranging from moderate to extreme and radical beliefs. Therefore, it is possible to diversify the basic ideas and forms

of conservatism from a moderate middle ground to radical extremes (Manhaim, 1986; 74).

After expressing the transformations and changes that conservative thought and attitude have undergone throughout history, there are views asserting that conservative thought, whether at the level of organized political parties or as an individual entity, finds itself in a schizophrenic dilemma within the context of modern world relations. Especially, Daryush Shagen characterizes conservatism not only as a societal and political movement but also as the ideological foundation of a hegemonic state like the Islamic Republic of Iran, describing it as wounded consciousness. This situation is claimed to not only have psychological implications but also to result in an ontological crisis in its relationship with modern lifestyle and practices (Shaygen, 1995; 64). When the phenomenon of religion is considered as a constituent element of identity within modern life, it becomes evident that conservatism's ontological world design faces ontological and epistemic challenges within the secular realm of modern life. While this crisis is inherent in thought itself or in the pragmatic stance and politics as a political movement, it is very concretely manifested in all forms of acquisitions in conservative political movements. The legitimization of this behavior, although rooted in conservative thought's fundamental arguments such as the sense of the past, nostalgia, sublimation of the past, and the need for a strong memory, also reveals a pragmatism that requires forgetting just as much as it requires a strong memory when faced with the problems of practical life (Geoffrey, G. Hamlin, A, 2016; 340).

In many approaches critical of conservative thought, particularly in Marxist and liberal approaches, it is criticized for not having the capacity and potential to redefine and describe itself at the philosophical and ontological level. Conservatism is often criticized for being more of a reactionary attitude towards a new order or societal design beyond itself rather than an original thought. Consequently, conservatism is defined as a derivative political movement rather than a fundamental one. Therefore, it is argued that conservatism as an ideology is more of a political ideology than a philosophical idea, as it corresponds more to a state of emotion rather than a rational philosophical concept. In response to these criticisms, Karl Mannheim argues that conservative thought may have a short history, but the tradition that nourishes conservative thought has a much longer history.

When examining the history and origins of conservative thought, this concept advocates the priority of institutions such as religion, family, and guild over the normative and abstract Jacobin design of the French Revolution. When classical conservatism is positioned as a reaction against the Enlightenment revolution and its political project, which is a practical result of the French Revolution and bourgeois bureaucratic rationalism, it is argued that even though the history of conservatism comes to an end when it interprets how pre-revolutionary people interpreted their reaction to the changes in history, it can still be understood through the broad margins of philosophy or the history of thought. Rational economic and bureaucratic rationality unique to Western civilization, which are products of Enlightenment philosophy and its design of reason, have spread from the West to all world societies. Rationality, even in the form of underdeveloped capitalism, is found in many different civilizations, such as numerical power, methodological

thinking, the observation of simple forms of music, customs, and laws. However, only in the West has it been able to develop rational law, musical harmony, and orchestration based on scientific technology and contemporary states. This kind of rationality is almost present in every civilization, but systematic rationalism that enters every field of human activity is unique to the West. Max Weber does not admire Western civilization's achievements; in fact, he acknowledges the price paid for it. He criticizes it as an intellectualized universe dedicated to specialization and artificiality, characterizing it as the escape from the enchantment of the World (Freund 1990;165)

With the Enlightenment came the rupture of life from ancient traditions, and it was during this period that the strong bonds of the soul detached from religious ties. Modern life, as it isolates individuals and fails to conform to the moral demands of these changes, explains their avoidance of responsibilities. Furthermore, it elucidates the need of the younger generation to follow small communities. In conservative social theory, unlike the bourgeois rationalism during the French Revolution, it assumes that institutions are formed by the accumulation of multiple human experiences stacked on top of each other throughout history. According to this assumption of conservatism, tradition is also referred to as accumulated wisdom.

Julien Freund, accused by positivist ideologies, argues that the distinctive features of conservatism, such as belief, skepticism, particularism, and originality, tradition, and pessimism, are not developed by external dynamics but are inherent in the founding regulations themselves, which explain suitable societal arrangements. These beliefs do not arise from political regulations; rather, they suggest that these beliefs are internalized and become norms through the continuous application of certain philosophical, political, or moral theories in social practices (Kekes,1997;361).

One of the fundamental theses of conservatism is the assumption that every society has an inner destiny. This assumption can be taken to the extreme in essentialist approaches. The positivist criticisms against this assumption suggest that the conservative reflex can do more harm than excessive admiration for the past, asserting that nothing can hinder progress more than this admiration, and nothing can hinder intellectual development more than this admiration. Conservatives argued for the preservation of traditional institutions, such as the family, religion, local community, guilds, and social classes, on moral grounds as well. Therefore, conservatives vehemently opposed teachings like equality, freedom, and popular sovereignty, just as they did with the natural law individualism of the Enlightenment. One of the key tenets of conservatism is to focus on the concrete individual rather than the conceptualized or political design object. Therefore, conservatism has a more pessimistic view of humanism and the future added to humanity by the Enlightenment. Regardless of whether these historical and theoretical debates are apologetic or reflective, it is methodologically necessary to define and understand conservative thought within a social context to understand how a conservative mindset is constructed within society.

Just as we examine the individual within the social structure to study society's mentality in terms of institutions and habits, we need to examine society to understand the conservative individual, which is a product of society. Alternatively, to explain the historical, social, and intellectual conditions of the formation of this conservative mindset, it is necessary to examine what kind of habitat this mentality was formed in, without excluding the terminology shaped by deep philosophical ontological or political theories. In fact, we need to look at the habitat of that mindset. Here, the concept of habitat, borrowed from plant sociology, is one of the concepts that we borrowed, but one of the developers of this concept is Pierre Bordieu with his concept of habitus. According to Bordieu, the concept of habitus, by uniting the past, the present, and the future in the concept of habitat, defines it as a deeply embedded state, waiting to be reactivated, settling at the very core of the body. While the concept of habitus may not cover the future dimension, it can be used as an explanatory analytical concept that can be used in explaining conservative thought as a combination of the past and the present in terms of historical, social, and intellectual conditions.

Analyzing conservatism in the political history of the concept of political history, both historically and as a mental habitus, and as a political ideology, considering the evolution of political culture and behaviors in terms of today's political trends and power relations, can shed light on the new forms, new tendencies, and qualities gained by the concept of conservatism. With the rationalization of neo-liberal policies through conservatism since the 1980s, the New Conservatism, which started with the 1929 Great Depression and overcame its structural crisis by the 1980s, manipulated the political behavior of conservative sections, which always constituted the majority of societies, at least by reconciling it with neo-liberalism, sometimes even consolidating these policies ideologically, in line with concepts such as "Moderate Islam" and "Inter-Civilization Dialogue" at the country and mass level. The legitimacy problem is a situation observed in history when opposing poles always come together in times of crisis in political structures and organizations. One of the basic assumptions accepted in political theory is that political power is established by force and later produces its own legitimacy. In other words, this assumption claims that all political administrations are initially established by force. Although this founding will is not subject to law, it is essentially an assumption expressed in many constitutional theories as the legislator who creates law. However, later political power established its legitimacy with consent, whether it be natural law or positive law notion, through ideological devices. The emergence of the sovereign as a founding will is ultimately read as a consequence of the effort to establish a mental and rational legitimacy ground for the worldview and political design of the bourgeoisie. In the social contract theories, sovereignty is transferred from God and, therefore, from the church to the earth, and this can also be read as an effort to create a mental and rational legitimacy ground for the worldview and political design of the bourgeoisie. In the social contract theory, Hobbes characterizes the outside of the sovereign as an area of equality, and therefore, as a continuous state of war where passions, fear, poverty, evil, loneliness, and barbarism rule. According to Hobbes, if equality is a continuous state of war, then sovereignty will emerge as an exception, as a product of inequality. The exceptional situation of sovereignty is explained best in political

theory by Carl Schmitt: "The sovereign decides in the exceptional situation." (Schmitt.1985;10). In a sense, in this exceptional situation, no one outside the state can kill or rob anyone. No one outside the state can punish anyone. No one outside the state can collect taxes. No one outside the state can be sure of the results of their work; in the state, everyone is sure of this. In summary, the outside of the state is the domain of passions, war, fear, evil, loneliness, barbarism, ignorance, and barbarism. (Hobbes,2007;138) The state, on the other hand, is a structure where reason, peace, security, wealth, good opinions, science, and good intentions prevail

3. Conservatism as a Reaction to the Enlightenment Ideology

In the 18th century, the Enlightenment philosophers aimed to establish ethical and political principles that would appeal to reason against established traditions with the goal of improving society through the reform of political institutions (Beveridge, Trunbull, 1997;124). The philosophical principles underlying Enlightenment thought assumed that humans are inherently perfect and, in terms of morality, beauty, and happiness, no different from one another. This notion was rooted in the cosmological understanding of the era, which was oriented towards scientific and Cartesian mechanical concepts. According to this mechanistic worldview, there is nothing beyond universal laws. Whether it be an individual or society, they are nothing more than singular instances of a general law. Even though the form of individual phenomena may be irreproducible, this form is ultimately subject to the analyzable regularities of universal laws (Simmel,2020;307).

Within the framework of Enlightenment philosophy, secular institutions had little place in the universal equation of the world, and there was even an implicit, if not direct, conflict with their representatives, particularly with God. This battle against God, influenced by Auguste Comte and having a significant impact on utopian socialists like Proudhon, naturally stemmed from many political and societal motivations. Opposition to the traditional alliance of the Church and the monarchy was one of the fundamental motivations of many bourgeois social orders. Enlightenment ideology found resonance initially among deist communities and communities with diverse forms of atheism or free churches, especially among Masonic communities (Schmitt1970;50).

As observed by Manheim, these thinkers, regardless of their political designs, were skilled "ideologists" who excelled at establishing a foundation and supporting the political structures they served.(Manheim.1986;14).As many historians have suggested, if the essence of the Enlightenment was a systematic attack on Christianity and, to some extent, all religions, conservatism argued that the essence of conservatism was the belief that no society, congregation, or group could exist separately from some form of religion. The hatred towards Christianity, evident in the thinking of Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, and other thinkers of the 18th century, would find its appropriate response in the great religious revival of

the early and mid-19th century. This revival took various forms in the theologies developed by Lamennais, Döllinger, and Newman, simply as a revival of beliefs (revivalism). The interest in religion's revival was closely connected to the writings of conservatives. There was a common belief that religion was a vital necessity in individual life, from Burke's reflections on the role played by Christianity in the development of European culture to Hegel's Legal Philosophy, which emphasized the complementary role of religion in politics (Naisbet, 1990; 114).

In the 17th century, as modern states began to take shape alongside absolute monarchies in Europe, the philosophical and intellectual foundations of a secular worldview were laid. The political ideology of the bourgeoisie was shaped within these conditions, necessitating the development of a new understanding of state and society that could legitimize their rationality in a worldview that discussed money, capital, and interest. This new state understanding was non-religious and was based on a foundation that stemmed from the class nature of the state itself. This class nature of the state can also be found in the connotations of the concept of the state itself in the political discourse of the time. With the development of the modern state, the political experience of modern Europe, 'state,' l'état, stato, etc., became a word used for a new political experience. The term originally meant any 'condition' but specifically a 'social' condition. When the Romans used this word politically, they did so by qualifying it with another word: hence, "status civitatus" meant the political condition of the Roman community.

Oukshot defines the characteristics of modern European states as follows: a political entity governed by a government with sovereign authority in a defined geographical area where the population resides as a collective force. The members of this political sovereign structure consist of a society that has acquired or is in the process of acquiring a certain sense of belonging. When constructing the modern state, it is considered primarily as a political organization. This structure is akin to a house built largely from second-hand materials. The construction of this political structure is not solely the work of one person's architecture. This structure, over the years, was constructed by combining old materials left from previous ruins with new materials, with some stones being re-carved and reshaped, similar to a medieval castle or monastery; other materials were extracted from existing ruins, taking up more space in the construction of this political structure (Okhesoot, 2004; 416). The new form of this structure, assembled differently, was presented to be used in the creation of new centralized states

As a result, there are two fundamental approaches to defining the structure of the state in modern European thought. In the first approach, the state appears as a natural society. In the second approach, the "state" appears as an "artificial" entity, seen as a political construct formed by social contract on specific selected purposes, with connecting bonds and social agreements (Okhesoot, 2004; 419).

Louis Althusser, while arguing that the feudal institutions were dismantled to eliminate unequal structures and build a new social model, described social contract as follows: "To say that human society is born from a contract is actually to declare that all social institutions are entirely the product of human hands and artificial. It means saying that society is neither the result of a divine institution nor of a natural order. Therefore, this is primarily a rejection of an old idea about the

foundation of social order and a proposal for a new one. Everything made by human hands can be destroyed by human hands. Because, aside from what comes from the essence of nature, nothing is indestructible. And nature, he claimed, does not make anyone a king, rich, or a master.

5. Tradition

Tradition is defined as a series of traditional beliefs, practices, and actions that secure people's allegiance to institutions, ensuring the continuity of attitudes and behaviors from the past to the present. Tradition does not always have to carry a religious or sacred content; it can pertain to the heritage of any institution or practice. This tradition may manifest as a judicial custom, a thoughtfully designed conscious judgment, such as negotiation. Alternatively, it may arise spontaneously, as in the case of sports fandom, or it may be connected to the history of religious institutions, even in honorific institutions like the Nobel Prize or human-centered organizations like the Red Cross. It may also manifest in egocentric competitions or in legal proceedings (Kekes, J. 1997; 365).

However, despite being rooted in tradition, conservative thought is a modern ideology that differs from tradition both in scope and historical context. These distinctions particularly arise in the context of modern conservatism emerging as a function of specific historical and social circumstances. Traditionally, conservatism is generally characterized as a psychological attitude in which individuals display adherence to old customs and attitudes, often expressed through a fear of innovation. The fundamental motivation underlying this attitude is a phenomenon that has developed within the context of modern progress. It serves a specific function in shaping this process. What was once a factor playing a role in every individual has now become a unifying factor for certain tendencies throughout the entire course of development. A conservative attitude towards life depends on the transformation of a historical situation into a concrete structural entity that corresponds to a specific trend. Thus, this attitude emerges in response to the rendering of these institutions by the ideology of modern progress as obsolete (Mahheim. 1986; 75).

In other words, conservatism ceases to be merely a formal attitude in every individual, taking on a specific structural, tangible quality or forming the intellectual and ideological foundation of this structure. To put it more concretely, while tradition vaguely refers to an official psychic quality present in every individual, acting conservatively refers objectively to an action within a given structural context. Acting in a politically conservative manner during any given historical period encompasses an unpredictable mode of action. However, how traditional behavior will manifest itself in any given situation can be well predicted based on the formal determinants of this "general mode of behavior." For instance, there is no doubt about the conservative reaction when a new railway is introduced. However, how a conservative or a political conservative of a certain era will behave

can only be predicted based on our knowledge of the distinctive character and structure of the "conservative movement" in the country.

Conservatism can be described as adhering to old methods, being resistant to innovation, and simply reacting against any form of reform. The role of conservatism in shaping one's religious identity is still present in modern times and remains connected to vestiges of mystical thinking in our consciousness. In contrast, traditional behavior can find a space within autonomous lifestyles without being tied to any form of conservative thought. For example, even individuals who are politically "progressive," despite their political beliefs, may position themselves within a predominantly traditional attitude and demeanor in certain aspects of life.

At one point, as a result, it is possible to characterize conservatism as a historical and sociological ideal type that corresponds to the meaning carried by the word. Conservatism can be described as a mentality that encompasses the world and objects as a way of understanding emotion, thought, and attitude, in the form of emotion, thought, and attitude. Sometimes, even though the fundamental roots of this thought are identified at a theoretical level, we see that the experience and knowledge of this attitude can change. While it may not be possible to simply define conservative thought through the concepts of sociology of religion, classifying the connotations of the concept in a clear manner is not an easy distinction. The distinguishing feature of conservative acquisition, which distinguishes the forms of thought from others, can only be clarified with its multiple dimensions over time. This distinctive definition also raises the question of whether conservatism points to a universal, timeless phenomenon for all of humanity or whether it should be seen as a newly emerging modern formation in a historically and sociologically determined manner.

Despite all this uncertainty, it is possible to refer to conservatism as a unified tendency in the history of modern thought only as an abstraction of a consistent political and spiritual tendency. Historically, we can distinguish conservative thought and acquisitions by abstracting them from generalizing concepts to prevent the confusion caused by their interaction with other ideological fields. Therefore, Karl Manheim's distinction is more concrete in this regard. Karl Manheim's distinction between "tradition," expressing a universal human quality, and "conservatism," specifically referring to a historical and modern phenomenon, distinguishes these concepts in the most understandable way. Conservatism has a short history as an ideology of modernity compared to the long history of tradition. While Karl Manheim distinguishes tradition from conservatism, he limits conservatism as a modern thought within time and space. Staying closely attached to the values of tradition means being exposed to the transformative power of modernization, and the reactions developed against it are called "natural conservatism (Manheim,1986;72). Weber defines "traditionalism" as the attitude towards modern movements. More concretely, in the distinction between tradition and conservatism, tradition corresponds to a psychological state that encompasses the general population of society, while conservatism is defined as a political attitude towards specific situations and decision-making processes as a public activity (Manheim, 1986;74).

From this, “tradition” corresponds to a more or less general psychological state in every individual, while conservatism is defined as political movements in any given historical period. Therefore, the structure of conservatism includes a mode of action that cannot be predetermined in advance. In contrast, it is easier to predict reactions based on the formal determinants of traditional behavior. For example, it is possible to predict the attitude of traditionalism toward any technological innovation, but we can say that the political attitude of conservatism depends on the political attitude in the country. To determine the type and peculiarities of conservative ideology in a specific country and historical conditions, it is necessary to know the existence of political contradictions among social classes. Political conservatism is not limited to being just a form of action; it also includes conscious and unconscious elements that feed a way of thinking and acting that can always be possible, not just a reaction. The tone of political conservatism in a certain country creates an objective spiritual context "derived from the subjectivity" of the isolated individual in the modern era. The form of this thought can take on various shades and colors over time. What is meant by the objective context here does not imply that deductive inferences can be made independently of the principles of conservatism that have eternal and universal validity. However, conservatism cannot exist apart from the concrete individual who realizes it. It cannot be considered as an inner principle subject to the law of development for the isolated individual of the modern era. However, under certain conditions, it can gain concreteness with respect to the belief experience of individuals. This concrete individual emerges as a framework of perception that is structured at the institutional level, both as a subject and an object, in relation to society or the community. For a conservative subject as an individual, it is not easy to determine where and how the lines of demarcation between the concrete and the spiritual can be drawn, even for the modern secular individual. Because, as Levi Strauss puts it, even the modern secular rational individual emphasizes that modern secular life is full of irrational and non-rational modern heresies (Strauss, 2000;234). An example of this can be given in the presence of fortune teller cafes in places where the modern secular way of life dominates in metropolises. Therefore, to understand the unique mode of existence of spiritual and psychic mood, it is necessary to first make a clear distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. Something can be separated objectively, isolated from the immediate experience of here and now, and at the same time have its existence as the contents that experience desires and aims for. Karl Manheim defines this situation as objective spiritual structural complexity because, although it is experienced by individuals within the social universe, these structures are institutionalized as mentalities that go beyond the individual's experience. However, these structures are still historical and can change over time and determine the attitudes of the community. The repeated forms that have become norms in this institutionalized or social acquisition form a complex structure by interweaving different shades, mentalities, attitudes, and beliefs at the level of psychic or symbolic contents over time. Although acquired attitudes and behaviors within these structures are produced or reproduced through the experiences of the individual, they still have a social quality because they are not independent of language and society. Because

no individual can create these structures alone, but these structures can emerge within the social universe. When Mannheim explains conservatism, he also has an objective nature as a spiritual structural complexity. Because it extends beyond the individual beyond personal experience, yet it is still temporal, changes with history, and reflects the form of the community.

6. Conclusions

This article attempts to delineate the intellectual and mental coordinates, methodological and historical boundaries of conservative thought as a tendency, recognizing that while it may be possible to determine the physical boundaries of this phenomenon as a national society, it is not possible to clearly define its symbolic boundaries. Therefore, in this article, we have sought to define this thought as a tendency through its interactions and relationships with other ideologies, as well as through the things it rejects, as much as the arguments it posits during certain periods of history. Because the robustness of a thesis depends on a thorough understanding of its antithesis as much as the thesis itself. In this context, conservative thought is a mode of thinking that needs to be understood through both what it claims and what it rejects (Kekes, J, 1997;355).

While delineating the distinctive aspects of conservative thought as an ideology compared to traditionalism, it was concluded that tradition extends over broader periods of time as a historical concept, whereas conservatism, as an ideology of the modern era, allows for relatively more definite determination of its intellectual and mental coordinates at the level of organizations and institutions.

The behavioral codes of conservative ideology in certain societies and at certain times were characterized by a somewhat stern seriousness, occasional bursts of anger extending at times even to fascism, suppressed selfishness, intolerance, anxiety about the future, a reactionary state of mind, sentimentality, the navigation among metaphysical clouds, and the transformation of romanticism and passions into reason. These fundamental criticisms developed against conservatism are rooted in skepticism and distrust towards the future, stemming from the conservatism's opposition to the Enlightenment era. These criticisms can also be read as natural consequences of the rational worldview of the Enlightenment. For instance, the dominance of imagination and fantasy over dry reason and deep reflection on the concept of aesthetics can be seen as a reaction and emotional need against the societal and political dominance.

Conservative thought, in a sense, has also been criticized as an attitude and mentality that reinforces the status quo, an indifference brought about by skepticism and distrust towards the future. These criticisms, to a large extent, can be understood as direct results of the Enlightenment and the institutionalization of reason. The Enlightenment philosophy's Condorcet spirit, as manifested in the phrase "Sapere aude" (Dare to know), which emphasizes placing human reason at the center, completely replaced traditional institutions with reason and its jury (Bierstedt, 1990; 24). The epistemology of the Enlightenment era, which placed human beings and human reason at the center, replaced the Church's jury with the jury of reason. What

was once under the Church's monopoly in terms of knowledge now turned into the Church of Science. Any knowledge that did not pass the test of reason's jury would lack legitimacy. Indeed, in the face of this jury of reason, the legitimacy of any knowledge that did not exonerate and convince itself would be questioned. Therefore, the claim that knowledge, based on natural law, was founded on this logic and theory did not correspond to concrete reality; indeed, it lacked a basis even from a historical records perspective. The replacement of social institutions, as in the Enlightenment, with individual reason and its forceful transformation would bring disaster and ultimately lead to its own defeat in the long run (Bierstedt, 1990; 19).

In conclusion, it is not possible to provide a universally applicable definition for the 'conservative' style of thinking as a unified trend in the history of modern thought. This trend has a relatively new origin compared to the tradition of thought, spanning only two centuries, making it a modern phenomenon. Therefore, to prevent conceptual confusion in this article, we have attempted to highlight the differences between conservative thought and traditionalism using the distinction that Maheim used for these two concepts. While conservatism can be seen as a response to the individual-centered view of the liberal world design, if society shapes the individual rather than the individual shaping society, is a common feature from its most moderate form to its most authoritarian forms. The fundamental belief of conservative thought is that the primary purpose of social life is not individual freedom but social authority. However, prosperity can be achieved under the authority of family, local community, church, and lodge. The essence of social connection is hierarchy and talk of equality often holds secondary importance. To claim that the authority of the state, which is the political form of social and political sovereignty, is derived from a contract among individuals in a state of nature is a mystification. This logic and theory, based on natural law, do not correspond to concrete reality, and it lacks a basis from a historical records perspective as well (Naisbit, 1990; 120). The revolutionary transformation of social institutions, as in the case of the Enlightenment, with the force of individual reason, brings disaster and ultimately defeats itself in the long term.

As a result, in the history of modern thought, the 'conservative' style of thinking cannot be universally defined as a unified trend. This trend has a relatively new origin compared to the tradition of thought, spanning only two centuries, making it a modern phenomenon. Therefore, in order to prevent conceptual confusion in this article, we have attempted to highlight the differences between conservative thought and traditionalism using the distinction that Maheim used for these two concepts. While Maheim defines tradition as a universal psychic tendency, he separates tradition from conservatism, considering conservatism as a modern thought and emphasizing the need to limit conservatism with space and time as a historical and methodological necessity. Consequently, the relationship of the trend described as conservatism with various political thoughts, different national contexts, and its multifaceted nature over different periods cannot be reduced to a single form or belief, emphasizing the composite nature of

conservatism, which can be understood with a multi-dimensional approach within various trends to some extent.

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